IN MEMORY OF THOMAS ALAN BOWMAN SR. U.S. Navy Veteran He was promised. They never delivered. His story →
BETRAYED BY THE VA Thomas Alan Bowman Sr. asked his country for help. He got silence. Sign the demand →

The Watchdog Record

Nothing on this page is this family's allegation. It is the federal government's own oversight record — the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) — documenting, year after year, how the VA's risk-management and disclosure machinery performs when the watchdogs check it. Every entry is linked to the report itself.

The Government Accountability Office

Veterans Affairs Health Care: Addition to GAO’s High Risk List and Actions Needed for Removal — GAO-15-580T, April 29, 2015. GAO placed VA health care on its High-Risk List in 2015, citing ambiguous policies and inconsistent processes, inadequate oversight and accountability, information-technology challenges, inadequate training, and unclear resource needs. Later GAO work confirms it remains there.

Veterans Health Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Health Care System — GAO-25-106969, November 2024. The report that examined the risk office itself: VHA’s Office of Integrity and Compliance — the office responsible for compliance and risk management — “has partially followed each of GAO’s six leading practices for managing risk,” and its Audit, Risk, and Compliance Committee “provided limited guidance and made no recommendations.” GAO made four recommendations.

VA Health Care: Improvements Needed in Processes Used to Address Providers’ Actions That Contribute to Adverse Events — GAO-14-55, December 2013. At the four medical centers GAO visited, none adhered to all four protected peer-review policy elements reviewed — including timely completion of reviews — and no one at VHA, the networks, or the OIG monitored whether peer-review triggers were ever implemented.

VA Health Care: Improved Oversight Needed for Reviewing and Reporting Providers for Quality and Safety Concerns — GAO-18-260T, November 2017. Five medical centers required clinical care reviews of 148 providers; the facilities could not document reviews for almost half. Of nine providers who should have been reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank, the facilities did not report eight — and reported none of the nine to state licensing boards.

Veterans Health Care: VHA Processes for Responding to Reported Adverse Events — GAO-12-827R, August 24, 2012. The machinery, mapped: after an adverse event, a facility chooses among root cause analysis, peer review, clinical care review, and an administrative investigation board — and GAO notes that what root cause analyses and peer reviews produce is protected and confidential under federal law and cannot be used to support actions against clinicians.

VA Health Care: Actions Needed to Assess Decrease in Root Cause Analyses of Adverse Events — GAO-15-643, July 29, 2015. Medical centers completed 18 percent fewer root cause analyses in fiscal year 2014 than in fiscal year 2010, while reports of adverse events rose 7 percent. The National Center for Patient Safety knew of the decrease; VHA “has not analyzed the reasons for the decrease.”

VA Health Care: VA Uses Medical Injury Tort Claims Data to Assess Veterans’ Care, but Should Take Action to Ensure That These Data Are Complete — GAO-12-6R, October 28, 2011. Tort claims filed against the VA rose 33 percent from fiscal years 2005 to 2010 (1,251 to 1,670). In fiscal year 2010, about $30 million was paid on the 277 claims resolved through VA’s administrative review and about $49 million on the 114 resolved through litigation. And the loop failed: regional counsel offices did not notify the VA’s medical-legal office of 16 percent of paid tort claims (fiscal years 2005–2010), so those cases were never reviewed for substandard care or data-bank reporting.

The VA Office of Inspector General

Institutional Disclosure Policy Requirements Should Be Clarified — Management Advisory Memorandum 23-02386-91, March 13, 2024. The OIG found the language of the disclosure directive unclear and its application inconsistent across fiscal 2022–2023 inspections — including adverse events where disclosure appeared required and was not done, and facility staff and leaders who failed to disclose sentinel events on a belief that institutional disclosure was leadership’s choice. The memorandum records that VHA’s Office of Medical-Legal Risk Management knew the language was ambiguous and intended to clarify it.

Semiannual Report to Congress, Issue 96 — VA OIG, November 2026 (reporting period April 1–September 30, 2026). The watchdog’s current scale, across the whole department: 152 reports and other products with 392 recommendations in six months, and 22,021 hotline contacts in the period.

Then there are the inspections — facility after facility, the same finding in the same words: the disclosure the policy required was never made.

Review of the Peer Review Process at the VA Caribbean Healthcare System in San Juan, Puerto Rico — Healthcare Inspection 25-04138-129, June 4, 2026. The peer review process otherwise met requirements — but “the peer review committee made decisions regarding completing institutional disclosures, which is not part of the committee’s quality management process, that should have been made by facility leaders.”

Review of Care Provided to a Patient Who Died by Suicide, Marion VA Health Care System in Illinois — Healthcare Inspection 24-02987-27, January 8, 2026. Providers did not address the patient’s reported falls and head strikes or consider a traumatic brain injury evaluation; separately, “facility leaders did not consider an institutional disclosure due to not identifying concerns with the patient’s care.” Thirteen recommendations.

Mismanaged Mental Health Care for a Patient Who Died by Suicide and Review of Administrative Actions at the VA Tuscaloosa Healthcare System in Alabama — Hotline Healthcare Inspection 23-02393-250, September 26, 2024. A patient died by suicide six days after an appointment at which required screening and warnings were missed; “facility leaders did not conduct an institutional disclosure due to an erroneous understanding of requirements.”

Healthcare Facility Inspection of the VA New Jersey Healthcare System in East Orange — Healthcare Facility Inspection 25-00242-195, September 25, 2026. Inspectors found “adverse events … that may have warranted institutional disclosures to patients or their personal representatives, as required by VHA Directive 1004.08,” alongside gaps in the facility’s processes for identifying such events at all.

Deficiencies at the Lieutenant Colonel Charles S. Kettles VA Medical Center in Ann Arbor, Michigan — Healthcare Inspection 24-00234-53, February 4, 2025. Among the substantiated deficiencies: “facility leaders’ failure to consider an institutional disclosure for an adverse event.”

Death of a Patient, Deficiencies in Domiciliary Safety and Security, and Inadequate Contractual Agreement at the VA Northeast Ohio Healthcare System in Cleveland — Healthcare Inspection 19-07091-159, May 28, 2020. No provider ordered an expected electrocardiogram before methadone was started for a domiciliary patient who died; “facility leaders did not make an institutional disclosure to the patient’s next of kin.”

Read together, the two watchdogs describe one pattern from two directions: the reviews happen behind a statutory seal, the disclosures the policy promises are missed in facility after facility, and the office charged with managing the risk has been found — by the GAO, in 2024 — to only partially follow the practices for managing it. The family’s own November 2026 experience is documented in the case study.

The Whistleblower Door

Three doors, one intake — your story, under permissions you set. Inside the system instead? You have a protected door of your own: The Whistleblower Door — a statement line, and the law that protects the people who use it.

+1 (386) 251-1318 The Whistleblower Door