Gundam 22: Eight Airmen, a Gearbox That Had Failed Before, and Two Official Stories
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Gundam 22's crew did everything the public investigation said they did, and the gearbox failed anyway. That sentence contains the whole dispute. On November 29, 2023, a CV-22B Osprey of the 21st Special Operations Squadron crashed into the sea off Yakushima, Japan, killing all eight airmen aboard — the deadliest Osprey crash in Air Force service. The Air Force's public Accident Investigation Board blamed a catastrophic gearbox failure and the crew's decisions across six warning lights. An internal Safety Investigation Board report — never officially released, later obtained and reported by Military.com — traced the failure to defects in the gear metal itself, to at least seven similar gearbox failures stretching back to 2013, and to a formal manufacturer warning in 2014 that the program office answered with financial penalties rather than a fleet fix. Who knew the gearbox could kill, and when they knew it, is now a question in federal court. This page keeps the two records separate, because the institution has never merged them.
The service, and the promise
The eight airmen killed aboard Gundam 22, all of Air Force Special Operations Command’s 353rd Special Operations Wing and its 21st Special Operations Squadron, were:
- Maj. Jeffrey T. Hoernemann, 32
- Maj. Eric V. Spendlove, 36
- Maj. Luke A. Unrath, 34
- Capt. Terrell K. Brayman, 32
- Tech. Sgt. Zachary E. Lavoy, 33
- Staff Sgt. Jake M. Turnage, 25
- Staff Sgt. Jake M. Galliher, 24
- Senior Airman Brian K. Johnson, 32
The CV-22B Osprey is a tiltrotor: it takes off like a helicopter and flies like a turboprop, through two proprotor gearboxes that carry the full power of its engines to the rotors. Those gearboxes are among the most mechanically stressed components in any aircraft in the inventory. A crew flying an Osprey cannot inspect a gearbox. It can only trust three things: that the machine was built from sound material, that the institution operating the fleet has told it the whole truth about the fleet’s failure history, and that when warnings come, the procedures it was taught reflect the real risk — not a softened version of it.
Each of those three trusts is examined in the records below. The public record, produced by the Air Force itself, found fault in the crew’s urgency. The unreleased record, produced by the Air Force’s own safety investigators, concerns the metal, the history, and the warning that was answered with contract paperwork. The families of the eight men are entitled to both. Until a leak, they had only one.
What happened
On November 29, 2023, Gundam 22 was flying a training mission in Japan when its left proprotor gearbox began shedding metal. The gearbox’s chip detectors — sensors that register metallic debris in the oil — warned the crew repeatedly: six chip warnings over the course of the flight, with “chip burn” procedures used to clear debris between warnings.
The crew continued the mission through the early warnings. Eventually the aircraft turned toward Yakushima to land. It never arrived. The left proprotor gearbox failed catastrophically — investigators later determined that a high-speed planetary pinion gear had fractured into five pieces — and the Osprey rolled and crashed into the sea off Yakushima Island. All eight airmen were killed. The wreckage and the crew were recovered from the water in the days that followed.
What a crew should have done with those warnings became one of the two central questions of the investigations. The other — what was happening inside that gear, and whether it had happened before — became the question the public record answered last, and least completely.
What the institution did afterward
The Air Force produced two investigations, and the public has officially received one of them.
The public record — the Accident Investigation Board report, released August 1, 2024. The Board found two causes. First, the material failure: a catastrophic failure of the left proprotor gearbox, in which the high-speed planetary pinion gear fractured into five pieces. Second, the crew: the Board concluded that the crew’s decisions were causal — that across six chip warnings they showed an “insufficient sense of urgency,” continued the mission instead of treating the warnings with the seriousness the procedures required, and did not divert when the accumulating warnings demanded it. The Board also faulted the V-22 Joint Program Office for failing to share safety data that could have educated crews on the severity of the gearbox risk — a sentence inside the Air Force’s own report that points directly at the second record.
The unreleased record — the Safety Investigation Board report, obtained and reported by Military.com in August 2024. Safety board reports are privileged by design, kept internal so witnesses speak freely; this one reached the public only through a leak. Its account of the metal differs from the public report’s emphasis:
- The gear’s crack was most likely caused by non-metallic material inclusions — impurities embedded in the X-53 alloy steel, manufactured by Universal Stainless — from which the gear was made.
- The failure was not the first of its kind. The safety investigators documented seven previous pinion-gear failures since 2013, five of them caused by the same inclusions.
- In 2014, the manufacturers — Bell and Boeing — sent the Joint Program Office a formal risk assessment titled “Gear Metal Raw Material Impurities,” warning of the defect. The safety board found that the assessment did not adequately reckon with the risk of a high-speed gear failure — and that the government’s response, through Naval Air Systems Command, was contract withholds: financial penalties against the contract. The failures continued.
- The safety board’s account, as reported, centered the failure in the metal and its history — a gear cracking from inclusions documented across the fleet for a decade. Set beside the public report’s crew-causation finding, it poses the question litigation now presses: whether anyone with the full history in hand gave the fleet, and this crew, a truthful account of how dangerous a chip warning in that gearbox could be.
The contested point, stated precisely: who knew what, and when, about the gearbox’s defect history is contested and pending in litigation. The Air Force’s public report assigns causal weight to the crew. The leaked safety report assigns the failure to defective metal with a documented decade-long history and a written 2014 warning. At a June 12, 2024 hearing of a House Oversight subcommittee — held before either report was public — the Pentagon had still not produced data on gearbox failures that Congress had requested, and the Navy’s V-22 program leadership testified that the failure appeared to be a catastrophic material failure of a kind not previously seen. That testimony sits on the record beside the safety board’s chronology of seven prior failures since 2013, five from the same inclusions. The two statements have never been reconciled by the institution that produced both.
Where it stands now
The families cannot sue the Air Force. The Feres doctrine bars service members and their estates from suing the government over injuries incident to service — the same wall that stands behind several pages in this series. So the estates sued the companies.
The estate of Staff Sgt. Jake Galliher sued Bell Textron, Boeing, and Universal Stainless in the Northern District of Texas, filed November 29, 2024 — one year to the day after the crash. The estates of the other seven airmen sued the same three defendants in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on August 8, 2025 (Case No. 2:25-cv-04522-JFM). The complaints allege that the defendants knew of the inclusion defect and the gearbox’s failure history and failed to warn or to act — allegations, to be tested in court, not findings. The defendants’ positions will be made in those cases. No court has yet adjudicated who knew what about the metal in Gundam 22’s gearbox.
That leaves the case in a posture this series has documented before: the institution that operated the aircraft has issued a public report emphasizing the dead crew’s decisions; the institution’s fuller internal account, assigning weight to a decade of known material failures, is one the public possesses only because it leaked; and the factual fight over the defect’s history has moved to civil courtrooms, against manufacturers, because the law forbids the families from putting the questions to the Air Force itself.
The eight men of Gundam 22 flew an aircraft whose gearbox had been shedding warnings — literally, in the cockpit, and figuratively, across a decade of failure reports. The public record says they responded to the last set of warnings too slowly. The leaked record says the warnings that mattered most were delivered in 2014, in writing, to an office that answered with a withholding schedule. Both records are the Air Force’s own work. Only one of them was meant to be read.
The ledger
What was owed
- Gearboxes built from metal free of the inclusions the manufacturers themselves flagged in writing in 2014.
- A fleet safety history told whole: if pinion gears had been failing from those inclusions since 2013, the crews flying behind them were owed that history and procedures written for the real risk.
- A public accounting in which the institution’s complete findings — not only the releasable ones — answer for a crash that killed eight men.
What was paid
- Eight lives on November 29, 2023: Maj. Jeffrey Hoernemann, Maj. Eric Spendlove, Maj. Luke Unrath, Capt. Terrell Brayman, Tech. Sgt. Zachary Lavoy, Staff Sgt. Jake Turnage, Staff Sgt. Jake Galliher, and Senior Airman Brian Johnson, killed when Gundam 22’s left proprotor gearbox failed off Yakushima, Japan.
- A public Accident Investigation Board report (August 1, 2024) finding the gearbox’s high-speed planetary pinion gear fractured into five pieces — and finding the crew’s decisions across six chip warnings causal for “insufficient sense of urgency,” while also faulting the Joint Program Office for not sharing safety data with crews.
- An internal Safety Investigation Board report, never officially released, documenting the X-53 alloy inclusions, seven prior pinion-gear failures since 2013 (five from the same inclusions), the 2014 Bell/Boeing risk assessment “Gear Metal Raw Material Impurities,” and a government response of contract withholds — obtained by the public only through a leak reported in August 2024.
- A congressional hearing on June 12, 2024 at which requested gearbox-failure data had still not been produced.
- Two lawsuits: the Galliher estate’s, filed in the Northern District of Texas on November 29, 2024, and the other seven estates’, filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on August 8, 2025 — both against Bell Textron, Boeing, and Universal Stainless, the Air Force itself being beyond suit under Feres.
What remains open
- Contested, in litigation: who knew what about the inclusion defect and the failure history, and when — the manufacturers’ knowledge, the program office’s response, and whether the fleet was ever told the whole of it.
- The conflict between the public report’s crew-causation finding and the safety board’s material-failure account has never been resolved by the Air Force in a single public document.
- The safety report itself remains unreleased. The families, and the public, hold it only because someone leaked it.