The San Clemente Nine: A Sinking the Marine Corps' Own Investigation Called Preventable
English · Español · Français · Italiano · 中文 · Tiếng Việt · Tagalog
An assault amphibious vehicle is a promise made of steel: it will carry Marines from ship to shore through the surf, and if the sea gets inside it, the men inside will have the training, the lighting, the exits, and the rescue they need to get out. On July 30, 2020, off San Clemente Island, that promise failed at nearly every point the Marine Corps later examined. The vehicle leaked through badly installed fittings, its transmission failed for want of oil, its bilge pumps were overwhelmed, the troops in back had never been trained to escape a sinking vehicle, its egress lighting did not work, and no safety boat was in the water. Nine of the sixteen men aboard died — eight Marines and a Navy hospitalman — in a training accident the Marine Corps' own investigation concluded, in a single sentence, "was preventable."
The service, and the promise
The nine killed were members of Battalion Landing Team 1/4 and the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, training off California’s San Clemente Island:
- Lance Cpl. Guillermo S. Perez, 19
- Pfc. Bryan J. Baltierra, 18
- Lance Cpl. Marco A. Barranco, 21
- Pfc. Evan A. Bath, 19
- Pfc. Jack Ryan Ostrovsky, 20
- Cpl. Wesley A. Rodd, 22
- Lance Cpl. Chase D. Sweetwood, 18
- Cpl. Cesar A. Villanueva, 21
- Navy Hospitalman Christopher Gnem, 22
Amphibious training is dangerous by nature, and everyone in the vehicle knew it. What training is supposed to do — what the institution promises in exchange for that accepted danger — is strip away every additional danger that preparation can remove. The vehicle will be inspected and watertight. Its machinery will be serviced. The troops it carries will have practiced escaping it underwater, in the dark, before the day they must. Safety boats will be in the water. A distress signal will be seen the moment it is raised.
The command investigation the Marine Corps released on March 25, 2021 reads, item by item, like a list of those promises broken. The investigation, endorsed by Lt. Gen. Steven R. Rudder, found a “confluence of human and mechanical failures” and stated its conclusion without qualification: “Ultimately, the tragic mishap was preventable.”
What happened
On July 30, 2020, sixteen Marines and sailors were aboard an assault amphibious vehicle (AAV) conducting waterborne training near San Clemente Island, returning toward the amphibious transport dock USS Somerset. The AAV began taking on water.
The investigation later established why. Water entered through multiple leaks, including a badly installed headlight. The vehicle’s transmission failed — it contained no oil — leaving the AAV dead in the water. Its bilge pumps could not keep up with the flooding and were overwhelmed. A vehicle designed to swim was sinking by degrees, with sixteen men aboard.
The crew raised the November flag, the signal for distress. The signal was not seen promptly. Another AAV arrived roughly twenty minutes after the signal; by the time the rescue vehicle pulled alongside, the stricken AAV had been sinking for approximately forty-five minutes. In the maneuvering alongside, the two vehicles collided. A wave swept through the stricken vehicle’s open troop hatch, and it sank rapidly — in 385 feet of water.
Seven men survived. Lance Cpl. Guillermo Perez was recovered at the surface and pronounced dead at the scene. The remaining eight — Baltierra, Barranco, Bath, Ostrovsky, Rodd, Sweetwood, Villanueva, and Hospitalman Gnem — went down with the vehicle. Their remains were recovered with the AAV when it was raised on August 7, 2020.
Inside the sinking vehicle, the investigation found, the embarked troops had been left to improvise an escape they had never been taught. They had received no training in escaping a sinking AAV — no submerged-vehicle egress training of the kind the mishap demanded — and some of their swim qualifications were incomplete. The vehicle’s emergency egress lighting was disabled, the troop hatch was unmarked, and in the flooding dark the men used their cellphone lights to try to see. There were no safety boats in the water; the Navy safety boat assigned to the exercise was not operational.
What the institution did afterward
The Marine Corps command investigation, released March 25, 2021, after months of work, assigned the failure to the institution in terms investigations rarely use. The mishap, it found, was preventable — the product of human and mechanical failures compounding one another:
- The AAV platoon’s fourteen vehicles had sat idle for more than a year and were in “poor condition” when training resumed.
- The mishap vehicle leaked through multiple points, including the badly installed headlight, and its transmission had no oil.
- The vehicle had not undergone the required readiness evaluation before carrying troops on the water.
- The embarked troops had never been trained to escape a sinking AAV; egress lighting was inoperative and exits unmarked.
- No safety boat was in the water during the exercise, and the distress signal went unseen for a critical interval.
A Marine colonel, speaking to one of the families as the findings were delivered, put the institutional verdict in plain words the Associated Press carried around the world: “As an organization, we catastrophically failed.”
Accountability followed, in the personnel system rather than the criminal one. Col. Christopher J. Bronzi, commander of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, was relieved of command on March 23, 2021, days before the investigation’s release. Lt. Col. Michael J. Regner, commander of Battalion Landing Team 1/4, had been relieved in October 2020 and later faced a Board of Inquiry over his career. The commander of the 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, Lt. Col. Keith Brenize, also faced proceedings. In June 2022, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro issued letters of censure to five officers — among them Bronzi and retired Lt. Gen. Joseph Osterman, along with two Navy officers — for failures connected to the mishap and the readiness culture around it.
The Corps also acted on the machine. AAV waterborne operations were suspended after the sinking, and in December 2021 the Marine Corps ended AAV waterborne deployments and training in favor of the newer Amphibious Combat Vehicle — an institutional admission, in procurement form, that the aging fleet’s waterborne risk would no longer be accepted as routine.
The families pursued their own accounting in court. They sued BAE Systems, the vehicle’s manufacturer, alleging that a known defect in the cargo hatch design made escape from a sinking AAV nearly impossible. That allegation is the families’ claim in litigation, labeled here as such; it has not been adopted as a finding by the Marine Corps investigation, whose documented causes were the vehicle’s condition, the missing training, and the absent safety measures.
Where it stands now
The official record is unusually clear, and it has not been walked back: the sinking was preventable; the vehicle was in poor condition; the training was never given; the safety boat was never launched; the signal was not seen in time. Five officers carry letters of censure; two battalion- and MEU-level commanders were relieved, one before the investigation even concluded. The AAV no longer conducts the waterborne mission for which it carried those sixteen men.
What that record adds up to depends on who is reading it. For the institution, it is a closed case of cascading failure, investigated, owned in unusually candid language, and answered with reliefs, censures, and the retirement of a vehicle fleet from the water. For the families, the same record asks a question the censures do not answer: how a vehicle with no oil in its transmission, leaks in its hull, no readiness evaluation, untrained passengers, dead egress lighting, and no safety boat was cleared to swim sixteen men into deep water in the first place — and why every safeguard that should have caught one failure caught none of them.
The lawsuit against the manufacturer keeps one part of that question — the design of the hatch the men had to escape through — in front of a court. The investigation’s findings stand regardless of the suit’s outcome, because they were never mainly about the hatch. They were about an organization that, by its own written conclusion and its own colonel’s spoken one, failed at the ordinary duties of preparation — and nine men, the oldest of them twenty-two, paid for the failure in 385 feet of water.
The ledger
What was owed
- A watertight, serviced vehicle that had passed its required readiness evaluation before it carried troops.
- Troops trained to escape the vehicle underwater, with working egress lighting and marked exits.
- Safety boats in the water and a distress signal seen the moment it was raised.
- Commanders who would be told the truth about the fleet’s condition — the platoon’s fourteen AAVs had sat idle for over a year in “poor condition” — before they embarked sixteen men.
What was paid
- Nine lives on July 30, 2020: eight Marines and Navy Hospitalman Christopher Gnem, ages 18 to 22. Seven of the sixteen aboard survived. Eight of the dead were recovered with the vehicle on August 7, 2020.
- A command investigation (released March 25, 2021) concluding the mishap “was preventable” — leaks including a badly installed headlight, a transmission with no oil, overwhelmed bilge pumps, no required readiness evaluation, no egress training for the embarked troops, disabled egress lighting, no safety boat in the water, and a distress signal not promptly seen.
- Two commanders relieved (the 15th MEU’s Col. Christopher Bronzi, March 23, 2021; BLT 1/4’s Lt. Col. Michael Regner, October 2020, later facing a Board of Inquiry), proceedings against a third commander, and letters of censure to five officers issued by the Secretary of the Navy in June 2022.
- The end of the vehicle line’s waterborne career: AAV waterborne operations suspended in 2020 and ended for deployments and training in December 2021.
What remains open
- The families’ lawsuit against BAE Systems, alleging a known cargo-hatch design defect that made escape nearly impossible — an allegation in litigation, not a finding of the Marine Corps investigation, and unresolved in the cited record.
- The question no censure answers: how every independent safeguard — inspection, readiness evaluation, training, safety boat, signal watch — failed on the same vehicle on the same day.
- Accountability in the cited record is administrative: reliefs and censures. No criminal consequence is documented in it for the chain of failures the investigation itself called preventable.