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Elmo Zumwalt III: The Admiral's Son, Lost to the Order His Father Gave

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The order was given to save men's lives, and by the measure of the war it worked: clear the vegetation along the rivers, and the ambushes from the banks would stop. The admiral who gave the order, Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., commander of U.S. naval forces in Vietnam, had a son running a Swift Boat on those same rivers. Elmo Zumwalt III came home, became a lawyer, and at thirty-six was diagnosed with lymphoma; at thirty-eight, with a second, unrelated lymph cancer, Hodgkin's disease. He did not blame his father. He wrote a book with him instead, and in it he was more honest about the evidence than the government he had served ever managed to be. He died at forty-two, before the system conceded a single presumption. Then his father — inside the VA itself, as its Secretary's own special assistant — wrote the report that charged the institution with rigging the science. This page is the documented record of both of them.

The service, and the promise

Elmo Russell Zumwalt III served as a Navy lieutenant commanding a Swift Boat in Vietnam in 1969–70, on the rivers of the Mekong Delta and the Ca Mau Peninsula. His father, Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., was Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam — the “brown-water Navy” — and it was the elder Zumwalt who ordered Agent Orange sprayed along the riverbanks to strip the vegetation the Viet Cong used for ambush. The admiral’s later testimony put the arithmetic of that order plainly: casualties among the riverine crews had been running at a rate that gave a young man a 70 percent chance of being killed or wounded in his tour; defoliation cut the casualty rate drastically. The order was given in good faith, to protect the men under it — including, as it happened, his son.

Elmo III left the Navy in 1970 and became a lawyer in North Carolina. The promise made to him was the standard one, and there is a second one specific to his house: that a commander’s service answers for its consequences. His father spent the last decade of his own life trying to make the institution honor both.

What happened

In January 1983, Elmo Zumwalt III was diagnosed with lymphoma. In 1985, he was found to have Hodgkin’s disease as well — a second, unrelated cancer of the lymphatic system. His son, Elmo Russell Zumwalt IV, born in 1977, had a severe learning disability, which the family attributed to Agent Orange — the admiral’s grandson, in the family’s conviction, marked by a war that ended before he was born.

The family attribution is stated here as what it is: the conviction of the family, held by the father and the son alike. In 1986, father and son, with writer John Pekkanen, published their joint memoir, My Father, My Son (Macmillan). The younger Zumwalt did not blame his father for the spraying order — the book and the record are consistent on that point. And he refused, as a lawyer, to overstate his own case. In 1986 he wrote the most honest sentence anyone produced in the Agent Orange fight:

“I am a lawyer and I don’t think I could prove in court, by the weight of the existing scientific evidence, that Agent Orange is the cause of all the medical problems — nervous disorders, cancer, and skin problems — reported by Vietnam veterans, or of their children’s severe birth defects. But I am convinced that it is.”

His fight was public advocacy, not litigation: there is no documented personal VA denial in his story, because in his lifetime there was nothing to appeal to — the VA recognized no Agent Orange presumption for any disease he had. In May 1988, CBS aired the television film of My Father, My Son, with Karl Malden as the admiral and Keith Carradine as the son.

Elmo Russell Zumwalt III died on August 14, 1988, at the age of 42 — three months after the film aired, two years before his father’s report, three years before the Agent Orange Act.

What the institution did afterward

Admiral Zumwalt, by then the former Chief of Naval Operations, did the rest of the fighting from inside the institution that had failed his son.

On October 6, 1989, Secretary of Veterans Affairs Edward J. Derwinski appointed the admiral — serving without pay — as his special assistant on Agent Orange, charged with determining whether it was at least as likely as not that specific diseases were associated with exposure. On May 5, 1990, Zumwalt submitted his report. Its conclusions, in his own words, were that there was adequate evidence for the Secretary to reasonably conclude that it is at least as likely as not that Agent Orange exposure is related to a list of diseases that ran to more than two dozen: non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, Hodgkin’s disease, soft tissue sarcoma, multiple myeloma, leukemia, lung cancer, kidney cancer, prostate cancer, colon cancer, stomach cancer, liver cancer, brain cancer, chloracne and other skin disorders, birth defects, neurological defects, auto-immune diseases and disorders, and more. He further concluded that the VA’s own Veterans’ Advisory Committee on Environmental Hazards “has not acted with impartiality” in reviewing the evidence. And, as the report is quoted in later decisions of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, he charged that government officials had “intentionally manipulated or withheld” evidence bearing on the question.

The report was not released like a finding. It was issued marked with classified, confidential status — “NOT FOR PUBLICATION AND RELEASE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC.”

Three months later, on August 9, 1990, the House Government Operations Committee issued its own report, The Agent Orange Coverup, finding that the government had “suppressed or minimized findings” on Agent Orange and had compromised the Centers for Disease Control’s study of it. The admiral told a House subcommittee that summer that the CDC’s work had been, in his word, “a fraud.”

The concessions then came, in sequence, all of them after Elmo III’s death: compensation for non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma began under court order in 1990, within the framework the Nehmer litigation had forced on the VA; and on February 6, 1991, the Agent Orange Act was signed, establishing the presumptive system — in which Hodgkin’s disease and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, the two cancers that killed the admiral’s son, stand on the presumptive list. Later science reviews have kept them there. That consistency is not proof of causation in Elmo III’s individual case — he himself, the lawyer, would have been the first to say so. It is the institution’s eventual agreement with the position he and his father took in 1986, reached after it could no longer do him any good.

Admiral Zumwalt spent the rest of his life lobbying for the compensation his son never received. In 1999 he spoke at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund’s first In Memory Day ceremony, when Elmo III was added to the In Memory Honor Roll of those who died later of their war. In an essay adapted from his writing, “An Old Man’s Folly,” he put his son’s accounting in one sentence: “While Elmo survived the fighting in Vietnam, he failed to survive the war” — of “cancer believed to have been caused by his exposure to Agent Orange, the chemical defoliant used — on my direct orders.” The admiral died on January 2, 2000.

Where it stands now

Both diseases that killed Elmo Zumwalt III are today presumptively service-connected for Vietnam veterans as a matter of regulation; a man diagnosed with either, who served where he served, no longer has to prove what the Zumwalts could not. His father’s May 5, 1990 report survives in the Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. Collection at Texas Tech University’s Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, and is still quoted in veterans’ appeals — an official document, produced from inside the VA, that charged the government with manipulating the evidence on the question that killed the author’s son.

Elmo III is honored through the VVMF’s In Memory program, among “those we lost later.” The film of his book still circulates. Nothing in his individual case was ever compensated or formally acknowledged; the system’s answer arrived as policy, not as a finding, and it arrived in 1990 and 1991 — after August 14, 1988.

The ledger

The accounting, in three lines — what the record shows has been done, what it shows has not, and what is still being sought.

What has been done

What has not been done

What is being sought


Sources

Part of Betrayed, Not Forgotten — this site's accounting for the service members and veterans their own institutions failed.

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